Free Access – Wave-Riding and Hashtag-Jumping: Twitter, Minority ‘Third Parties’ and the 2012 US Elections

My new article, “Wave-Riding and Hashtag-Jumping: Twitter, Minority ‘Third Parties’ and the 2012 US Elections,” published in Information, Communication & Society has been made open-access (free) for 6 months (until September 2013).

Abstract: With the description of the 2012 election as the ‘most tweeted’ political event in US history in mind, considering the relative media invisibility of the so-called ‘third-party’ presidential candidates in the US election process, and utilizing the understanding of retweeting as conversational practice, the purpose of this paper is to examine the use of Twitter by the four main ‘third-party’ US presidential candidates in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election in order to better understand (1) the volume of tweets produced by the candidates; (2) the level of interaction by followers in the form of retweeting candidate/party tweets; and, (3), the subject and content of the tweets most retweeted by followers of the respective parties. The ultimate goal of the paper is to generate a broader picture of how Twitter was utilized by minority party candidates, as well as identifying the issues which led followers (and their respective followers) to engage in the ‘conversational’ act of retweeting.

Failed Journalism and the Rise of WikiLeaks and Anonymous

THE FOLLOWING IS A WRITTEN COPY OF MY PROFESSORIAL “INSTALLATION TALK” GIVEN AT STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY ON APRIL 17, 2013. THE INSTALLATION TALK IS A PUBLIC LECTURE INTENDED TO BE BOTH OF INTEREST AND UNDERSTANDABLE TO ACADEMICS AND NON-ACADEMICS ALIKE. ALSO, THIS WAS A TALK, SO THERE ARE NO LINKS! I MIGHT ADD SOME LATER.

“Failed Journalism and the Rise of WikiLeaks and Anonymous”

Christian Christensen

I would like to begin with a brief bit of self-plagiarism, quoting a portion of a talk I gave at Uppsala University in 2011 about the role of the academic in contemporary society which I feel is an ideal lead-in to what I will be discussing today: the failure of journalism and the rise of groups such as Anonymous and WikiLeaks.

So, this is part of what I said two years ago. And I quote:

Despite the many problems that we see within academia (from the dominance of certain paradigms to restrictive publishing and financing models), the university world is one which should depend upon the questioning of authority: be it authority in the form of theory, intellectual positions, but also the hierarchies of power within society in general. It is the role of academic, as I see it, to take the things that we take for granted and to ask: Why? Whose interests are best served in taking these things for granted? Are the benefits spread equally throughout society via our commonsense ideas? If not, how might we remedy this imbalance? These are the intellectual points of departure that made universities such crucial centers for dissenting intellectual opinions in relation to issues as varied as equal rights for women, for minorities, and for the working classes; and a wide variety of anti-war movements from Viet Nam to Iraq.”

To this, I would like to add the following from Michel Foucault, and I again quote:

The work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and to participate in the formation of a political will (where he has his role as citizen to play).

(…)

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.

So, what does this have to do with journalism? A lot, I would argue. Many of the issues which we associate with academia – freedom of speech, freedom of expression, critical thinking, keeping an eye on authority, education – are issues which we have historically linked to journalism. Thus, just as it is important to ask to what extent we as academics have investigated, questioned and challenged the distrIbution and use of social, economic and military power in society, so, of course, should we ask the same of the news organizations so eager to describe themselves as the ”Watchdogs” and ”Guardians.”

The premise of my talk today, as should be obvious from the title, is that the mainstream press in countries such as Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, have failed to engage in critical investigations into, and analyses of, the accumulation and utilization of power. And, it is this failure which has created a vacuum subsequently filled, in part, by activist groups such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous.

There is, however, a second premise, and that is that in our discussion of groups such as WikiLeaks or Anonymous, the emphasis is often placed squarely upon their use of technology, rather than the socio-political and cultural reasons behind their evolution. This techno-centrism, I would argue, deflects a measure of critique away from mainstream journalism, and ”explains” the rise of groups such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous as predominantly technological phenomena. In other words, they exist because the technology allows them to exist.

This is connected to a concept I have discussed in a few of my recent academic papers: that of ”technology discourse” (or, the ways in which our understanding of technology is shaped by the language we use to discuss it).  One of the leading scholars in the field of technology discourse, Eran Fisher has noted that there is a prevailing assumption in contemporary discourse on technology: namely that a new technology enables a new society, and, thus, that technology ”makes” society. This discourse, in turn, is defined as inherently transparent and unproblematic: to propose the emancipatory power of digital technology, for example, is not seen as the proposition of a subjective opinion, but simply the presentation of fact. As Fisher notes, this is important because within contemporary discourses on technology and globalization, ”the assumptions become even broader, encompassing societal values, development models and trajectories, and the means of fostering democracy, literacy and human well-being.” In short, technology discourse contributes to an uncritical celebration of technology, devoid of social or economic contextualization.

To get back to Foucault for a second, his suggestion that we need to ”criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent” is vital; in particular, his choice of the word ”workings”, because it points to a central idea in my talk: namely the importance of process. Where contemporary journalism has failed, I would argue, is in the lack of exposure and lack of analysis of the mechanisms of power that Foucault discusses. These are mechanisms that are neither sexy nor exciting, and can be mind-numbing in terms of the minutiae of political, legal, diplomatic or technological details. These details are, however, the building blocks of real power: blocks mostly obscured from public view under a veneer of PR, spin, infotainment and ”event”-based news coverage. Over the past few years, and to varied levels of success and impact, groups such as Anonymous and WikiLeaks have peeled back this veneer, exposing activities that are both shocking and banal.

Before I delve into some specific examples of process versus event, however, a few words regarding some of my earlier thoughts on WikiLeaks, technology and journalism might be in order.

After the leak of a significant volume of material on Afghanistan and Iraq (material for which Bradley Manning has been sitting in prison for three years), I published an article in Le Monde Diplomatique entitled, ”WikiLeaks: Three Digital Myths.” In this article I argued that the WikiLeaks phenomenon had raised a number of issues which I then came to define as ”myths.”

First, The myth of the power of social media. This relates to the idea that, somehow, all social media are created equal. When the term ”social media” is used, it often includes different platforms such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and so on, as if all of these can be neatly discussed under one technological umbrella.  They cannot, because different platforms allow for different uses, thus framing and shaping the type and form of the material posted (from message lengths on Twitter, to video lengths on YouTube to publication options and Terms of Use on Facebook). It’s a relatively simple concept which seems to be lost on a great many commentators.

Second, The myth of the dying nation state. One of the common statements one hears regarding groups such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous is the fact that they are rendering nation-states and national boundaries meaningless.  While it’s true that the WikiLeaks structure is set up to bypass the laws of certain countries (enabled by digital technology), it also makes use of other countries’ laws (such as Sweden, Iceland and Belgium). WikiLeaks isn’t lawless – it’s just moving the entire game to places where the rules are different. In other words, laws, and the nation-states who make those laws, still matter.

And, third, and most relevant to my talk today, the myth of the death of Journalism. Within this myth are the seeds of discussions that have taken place within university walls for the past 20 years: the idea that access to and use of technology by non-journalists – in various forms – will eventually lead to the downfall of professional journalism as we know it today. This has proved to be a myth, although one which is hard to kill. In the case of WikiLeaks,  what the organization did was not to replace mainstream journalism, but rather to force us to consider how the collaboration between WikiLeaks and newspapers such as The Guardian, Der Spiegel, El Pais and The New York Times heralded a new era of large data sets and data mining, as well as mainstream-activist relationship.

In a follow-up article on WikiLeaks, I wrote the following:

As a researcher, it struck me that the period shortly after the release of the “Collateral Murder” video, the “Afghanistan War Logs” and the “Iraq War Logs” illustrated the potential impact of the WikiLeaks-mainstream media collaboration. This was a rare and exciting (albeit short) period of political, professional and cultural introspection, particularly in the United States. US foreign policy and military spending, civilian deaths and possible war crimes in Iraq, journalistic under-performance after 9/11, and government transparency were all thrust into the open as topics for consideration. It appeared, during this short time, that WikiLeaks may have done something that I had thought near impossible: inserting a radical critique of US military and geo-political power into mainstream popular discourse (particularly in the US). Granted, the Guardian and New York Times are not the newspapers of choice for many in the US and UK. Far from it. Yet the very presence of the material on their front pages opened up the possibility that the murky world of US power might now be forced to concede ground to transparency advocates.

In retrospect, this admittedly brief analysis comes off as somewhat naive and short-sighted. As we now know, the relationship between WikiLeaks and these news outlets turned sour. But, the broken relationship between WikiLeaks and the mainstream news media does not change the fact that the relationship marked a shift in how activist organizations might collaborate with their mainstream counterparts, to the benefit of readers.

While it would be a stretch to say that September 11, 2001 was the genesis date for groups such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous, it would nevertheless be fair to suggest that the range of domestic (in the US) and geo-political events that followed those attacks 12 years ago had a profound effect upon global activism: from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the occupations of those two countries, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, the Bush presidency, the London and Madrid bombings, the global War on Terror, The Patriot Act.  In all of these cases, from the attacks themselves to the passage of restrictive censorship and privacy legislation, an understanding of ”workings” and ”process” was and is fundamental to understanding them.

The global media coverage of the attacks of September 11, 2001 is perhaps one of the best examples of how events can supersede process.  Broadly speaking, the attacks were framed as ”terrorism” masterminded by Osama Bin Laden, with Bin Laden himself the by-product of the a rather simplistic ”Islam versus The West” storyline. In popular terms, an understanding of Al Qaeda’s evolution, raison d’être and relationship to 1970s and 1980s regional politics (particularly in Afghanistan) was bypassed in favor of a recounting of 9/11 as an ”event.” As a PhD student at the University of Texas, I was scheduled to teach a class of over 500 students on the morning of September 12, 2001. In the class, we discussed the attacks, with many students asking the rhetorical question, ”Why do they hate us so much?”

This seemingly inane question was, actually, rather complex. But the fact that many university students (and a fair number of US adults) had little or no idea where to begin to look within geo-politics for the answer was an indictment of the US press, which for years has remained uncritical of US military interventionism and policy vis-a-vis Israel. The way in which the global media focused on the issue of WMD in Iraq, for example, spoke volumes about the power of the ”event.”

As the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan dragged on, it became clear that citizens also had little understanding of the mechanisms of the politics of war or the US legal system. As hundreds of billions of dollars were spent by the Bush and Obama administrations on the war effort, media still focused on surges and attacks, not corrupt no-bid contracts offered to former business partners of Vice-President Dick Cheney. And, as the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay Prison now enter their second month of hunger strikes, the limited amount of time spent by the media addressing the very legality of the prison, and the treatment of the prisoners, has become painfully apparent.

I do not wish this to be a lecture about the United States only, however. Here in Sweden, a number of recent stories have illustrated the tendency of the news media to only scratch the surface, rather than dig deeper. A few particular cases come to mind.

The first is the steady political rise of the Sweden Democrats. A number of months ago the party became the third most popular in the country: an unimaginable political reality only a few years ago. Yet, in large part, the news media in Sweden have avoided deeper discussions about how and why the party achieved this dubious honor, focusing instead upon poll numbers, and ”events” such as the ”iron bar” incident filmed in Stockholm last summer. This coverage is critical, of course, in the sense that it exposes a ”dark side” to party members. Yet these stories tend to remain at the level of the individual and the party, and never address the underlying tensions within Swedish society which have led to 10% of the population voting for an openly xenophobic party.

Similarly, the story broken a few days ago on TV4’s Kalla Fakta that 750 million kroner of Swedish taxpayer money had gone to Saab to finance the development of the Neuron attack drone was good, important journalism. As was the story broken by Swedish Radio some months back about Swedish state support for the construction of a weapons factory in Saudi Arabia. Yet, to once again return to the question of process, these stories expose singular (sometimes corrupt or illegal) activities, but do not address the fundamental role of weapons manufacture within the Swedish economy, the role played by the Swedish state in the promotion of the weapons industry, nor the inherent contradictions found when such promotion is combined with state discourse trumpeting Swedish diplomacy and commitments to human rights.

In light of the failure of mainstream journalism to tackle the issues I have just discussed, the void was at least partially filled by the actions of WikiLeaks and Anonymous. The two are somewhat different – WikiLeaks is a semi-structured whistle-blowing  website/organization while Anonymous is a a more free-floating collective of hactkivists who, ”publicize various wrongdoings, leak sensitive data, engage in digital direct action, and provide technology assistance for revolutionary movements” (Coleman). Of the two groups, WikiLeaks has identified itself more as a journalistic organization, although Anonymous, via the popularity of the @YourAnonNews Twitter feed, has begun to enter the news market.

Anonymous is best-known for activism opposing child pornography, surveillance, and extremist religious groups, various US government agencies, and even against Swedish government websites and businesses in response to the Assange case.  As Gabriella Coleman put it:

Anonymous is a distinct, emerging part of (a) diverse and burgeoning political landscape. Its real threat may lie not so much in its ability to organise cyberattacks but in the way it has become a beacon, a unified front against censorship and surveillance.

For both WikiLeaks and Anonymous, there is a commitment to expose corporate and state abuses of power, often by exposing the very mechanisms by which such power is exercised. The leak/hacking/publication by the two groups of emails, internal documents and memos, military videos, diplomatic cables, bank accounts in the service of increased transparency, as well as the assisted bypassing of surveillance or censorship, has caused great concern for corporations and state institutions.

In the case of WikiLeaks, a series of significant leaks pointed to the potential of the organization to act as an independent watchdog, as well as raising the possibility that WikiLeaks should be considered a journalistic/news organization in its own right.

While they are most famous for the files on Iraq and Afghanistan, it is worth noting that WikiLeaks also released a number of important documents detailing corporate and governmental abuses of power, some extremely serious, including:

  • the leak in 2009 of World Health Organization draft reports showing the influence within the organization of large pharmaceutical companies, and the their forcing developing nations to raise drug prices beyond the means of most citizens;
  • the leak of stories from 2009 on Trafigura: a company that engaged in illegal toxic dumping in Cote d’Ivoire, leading to serious health damage;
  • the leak of documents on the 2009 Copenhagen Climate summit outlining how the US threatened and bullied other countries to follow US line on climate change;
  • the leak of 2008 documents from Swiss bank Julius Baer suggesting money-laundering in the Cayman Islands (a California judge initially blocked WikiLeaks.org as a result, but later overturned on 1st Amendment grounds);
  • and, the 2008 and 2009 leaks of the membership list of the far-right, xenophobic British Nationalist Party.

In response to the WHO documents, James Love, the Director of Knowledge Economy International, said the following:

After reading these cables, it is difficult to stomach the defenses of US secrecy. Forcing developing countries to raise the price of drugs has predictable and well known consequences — it kills people, and increases suffering. Many people could care less — including reporters and editors of newspapers. How much of this ends up in the Washington Post, the New York Times or the Guardian these days? But others who do care now have more access to information, and more credibility in their criticisms of government policy, because of the disclosures of the cables.

WikiLeaks and Anonymous are an expression, a crystallization of a dissatisfaction with the extent to which primarily commercial, but also public service, news organizations have willingly absorbed elite discourses in relation to socio-economic, legal and military issues. Stories which expose political or corporate misconduct should not to be seen as the antithesis to these discourses. Often, such instances are simply defined as ”the exceptions that prove the rule” while the greater meta-story of capitalism and western power remain unchallenged. For example, the rhetoric of Sweden as a neutral country with a primary interest in diplomacy hides, to a certain extent, the economic and political power held by large corporations in this country: corporations involved in business activities antithetical to both democratic development and peaceful resolutions of disputes.  The cloudy role of the Swedish government in protecting Ericsson’s interests in Syria last year, for example, while covered by Dagens Nyheter and Swedish Radio, received relatively little press coverage given how it clashed with so much of the political discourse coming out of Stockholm regarding a commitment to freedom of speech and the rule of law.

But, this talk is not about the ”death” of journalism, but rather a particular failure: the failure to address process and context. Yet, the work of both Anonymous and WikiLeaks should be seen as positive developments for journalism, as they introduce new elements into the informational and democratic landscape. As Coleman also writes:

…the work of politics and social transformation requires a diverse toolkit – from fine-tuned government interventions to rowdy subversive tactics – and we should be wary of christening any particular tactic a magic bullet. (…) Distinct formats need not be mutually exclusive or even in competition; they can and do often cross-pollinate. We need compelling stories that dramatise the issues the government would like us to forget, and that make people care. We need investigative journalists who dedicate years to tracking down sources and putting the pieces of a difficult puzzle together. We need independent Internet Service Providers committed to the privacy of their users. And we need advocacy groups with lawyers, lobbyists, and policy strategists.

Ultimately, what is challenged by WikiLeaks and Anonymous, at the core, is not so much the mode of news and information production and distribution, but rather the relationship between mass media and those holding political-economic power. Anonymous and WikiLeaks force us to rethink a number of core democratic relationships: the one between citizens and the state (impacted by providing access to sensitive intelligence previously hidden from view); the one between citizens and the media (impacted by exposure of the shortcomings of an uncritical commercial media system); and, the one between media and governments (impacted by challenging the mantle of “watchdog” proudly trumpeted by major mainstream news outlets). This is not to say that these relationships altered dramatically, but rather that Anonymous and WikiLeaks, through an determination to challenge global hegemonies, have thrown down the gauntlet in front of those in power by laying bare (some of) the practices of authority hidden from public view.

As academics, such challenges are worthy of deeper examination, as they cut to the heart of the very democratic ideals both academia and journalism profess to uphold.

Nuance, Depth and the Relative Islamophobia of Homeland

Nuance, Depth and the Relative Islamophobia of Homeland

by Christian Christensen

Several years ago the highly-acclaimed – and supposedly über-liberal – television series The West Wing aired an episode in which President Bartlet had to address a diplomatic crisis involving Turkey. The story was that a woman in Turkey, found guilty of having sex with her fiancée before marriage, had been sentenced to death by beheading under religious laws implemented by a newly-elected Turkish government. The crisis for Bartlet was that he supported Turkish efforts to join the EU, but, naturally, opposed the beheading of women by rabid Muslim lunatics. In the end, Bartlet, while condemning the execution, maintained his support for Turkish EU membership. The sheer idiocy of this episode prompted me to publish a commentary in which I pointed out that, in reality, not only is Sharia Law a non-factor in the Turkish legal system, but Turkey – unlike the United States that President Bartlet presides over – does not even have the death penalty.

In broad strokes, conservatives hated the show because of a perceived liberal bias; liberals loved the show because it had a Democratic president with backbone, intelligence and ethics. The West Wing undoubtedly provided a kind of political pacifier to US liberals suffering through the darkest days of the George W. Bush administration. What made The West Wing Turkish story so egregious was the fact that the show was hailed as some kind of benchmark for “thoughtful” scriptwriting on behalf of the political left (US left, that is). The injection of a blatantly ill-informed, Islamophobic storyline into what was spun as an intelligent program only highlighted the extent to which, once one cracks the veneer of enlightenment encasing shows like The West Wing, what lies beneath is often little better than cheap xenophobia.

And this brings us to Homeland. Winner of back-to-back Golden Globes for “Best Television Series – Drama” the show has garnered positive feedback, including the following in a December 2012 Guardian editorial entitled, “In Praise of…Homeland”:

The presentation of good and evil is far more nuanced than in a conventional political thriller. One minute, the war on terror is depicted as a sad necessity; the next, terrorists show their human side. Herein lies Homeland’s strength: it is difficult to know where one’s sympathies should lie. The truth, as in life, hovers in the grey areas in between.    

Similarly, Emily Nussbaum of the New Yorker lauded the show for being the “antidote” to superficial shows about terrorism such as 24 (in fact, Homeland creators Howard Gordon and Alex Gansa were both writers on 24), finding Homeland to be, “surprisingly grounded in the world we live in.”

Therein, I would argue, we find the heart of the problem. The West Wing and Homeland may very well do a better (but not necessarily good) job of reflecting the nuances of politics or counter-terrorism in the United States than blunt fare such as 24, but these are, as Nussbaum put it, reflections of the world “we live in.” And which “we” is that, exactly? As Laila Al Arian noted, Homeland repeats so many Muslim stereotypes, and contains so many errors in fact and detail about Muslim and/or Arab culture, that she labels the program “TV’s most Islamophobic show.” (Reading Al Arian’s piece provides many excellent examples.)

Yes, The West Wing and Homeland contain dialog about the US political process and the War on Terror seldom, if ever, heard on US television. But if that dialog contains basic factual errors or crude stereotypes, then it is worth asking what, precisely, the show contributes to broader understanding of the issues in question? If the writers of The West Wing tell viewers that Turkey has a system of quasi-Sharia Law in place where women are beheaded for adultery, then no amount of sharp, intelligent writing can overcome the damage done by the use of that dramatic vehicle. Similarly, and as Al Arian points out in her Salon article, Homeland is based upon a single, overarching premise: that it is Brody’s conversion to Islam which enables his planned attacks against the United States. There are other factors (such as the death of the boy Issa), of course, but the core of the show revolves around his conversion.

And this is where Nussbaum’s notion of Homeland being “grounded in the world we live in” returns. The program is grounded, yes, but it is grounded in the America Americans live in: an America where an understanding of the nuances of Islam and countries with predominantly Muslim populations remains at a fairly elemental level. What makes programs such as Homeland dangerous is the idea that they represent a deeper, more mature analysis of these geo-politics, when, in fact, they represent a deeper analysis of a particular, limited understanding of geo-politics. Similarly, when critics hail programs like The West Wing and Homeland for their depth, intelligence and grounding in reality, the impact of Islamophobic content is all the more damaging. No-one expected 24 to be culturally-aware in relation to Islam, so when Islamophobic content emerged in the show, it was hardly a surprise. But, when Islamophobic material crops up in Homeland, it is easier to deflect critique of this material by pointing out the relative depth and relative broad-mindedness of the show. That is the problem with relativity in this context: when 24 or Jerry Bruckheimer are your bias benchmarks, then all is takes is content that is a bit less ethnocentric and a bit less xenophobic to make yourself look enlightened.

When critics hail Homeland, they would do well to ask themselves how they would react to a program where a Muslim captive at Guantanamo Bay succumbs to Stockholm Syndrome, converts to Christianity, returns to Kabul/Tehran/Riyadh, rises through the political ranks to a position of authority, and, with the help of a radical Christian CNN journalist, plots a campaign of terror in his home country at the behest of a Christian extremist. I think I can guess some of the words used to describe such a program, but “nuanced” and “grounded” would not be among them.

5 Arguments Why Opposing Islamophobia is Not a Defense of Extremism

(The following post has been published in Le Monde Diplomatique and Counterpunch.)

Recent events have generated a lot of debate about Islam, Muslims, free speech and Islamophobia. Unfortunately, much of that debate has fallen back upon rather tired arguments about not only what “Muslims are like” but also how those who oppose Islamophobia are somehow defending repression or appeasing extremists. In this short piece I would like to boil these lines of thinking down into five basic arguments, and offer my counter-response.

#1: Islamophobia is an irrational fear of Islam, but radical Islam is, for example, anti-feminism and anti-gay. So, to fear the spread is not irrational, and, thus, not Islamophobic.

I’ve heard this one a lot. The problem is that this statement takes as a point of departure that Islamophobia is all about an opposition to radical, fundamentalist Islam.  It isn’t. If fear of radical Islam were the same as “Islamophobia” then a lot of secular Muslims in Turkey could (ironically) be classified as Islamophobic. They are not, however, because Islamophobia is an irrational fear of Islam and Muslims in general, not just extremists, and rooted in crude stereotypes by which all Muslims are lumped together as some kind of uniform mass. There are plenty of anti-feminist, anti-gay elements within Christianity, for example, but those elements are rarely portrayed as representative of Christians as a whole. The problem is that it is the radical fundamentalist image of the Muslim which is usually used as the “default” image for all Muslims. This is what I have called the “hegemony of Islam” perspective whereby, in terms of identity, being a Muslim is seen as trumping all other factors: be they economics, education, gender, family history, and so on. In other words, in this stereotypical view, if you are a Muslim, your identity is subservient to your religious identification, with all other influencing factors a distant second. This faulty logic is applied to all Muslims, whether fundamentalist or not. That’s Islamophobia.

#2: Criticizing the very making of “Innocence of Muslims” and/or the Muhammad cartoons has a chilling effect on free speech, and is a form of soft censorship.

According to this line of thinking, “Innocence of Muslims” and the Muhammad cartoons are protected by free speech, but to criticize their making and/or content is somehow borderline censorship. No. To critique the manner in which free speech is exercised is in no way the same thing as saying that the right should be revoked or the speech banned. To use another example: I am opposed to the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. I am also opposed to any bans on protesting against these occupations. If, however, anti-war protesters decided to stage a protest at the funeral of a soldier killed in the war, and did so with placards saying that the solder deserved to die, then I would question both the mode and content of their free speech. That does not mean I would want to ban either their right to gather or their right to speech. It just means that I am exercising my right to free speech to question how others have exercised that same right. That’s how, not if. The interplay is actually the crystallization of free speech in action. The same goes for the anti-Islam film and cartoons. If you want to make an inflammatory film/carton during a time of crisis: fine. But don’t then be surprised if others exercise their rights in response.

#3: Muslim fundamentalists do not respect the values of free speech: look at what happened to Theo Van Gogh and Salman Rushdie. Why should we worry about their being offended?

This goes back to the point I made earlier: no-one who opposes Islamophobia is worried about the feelings of small numbers of unrepresentative, violent extremists. To bring up Theo Van Gogh or Salman Rushdie is to suggest that most Muslims were/are somehow in favor of Van Gogh’s murder, or the fatwah against Rushdie. If anyone has any solid evidence to support those extremely broad suggestions, I have yet to see it. It is also a very convenient strategy: to bring up Van Gogh when discussing Islamophobia as it is so emotive. Is the suggestion that the vast majority Muslims are simply unable of being offended without an accompanying desire to kill the person(s) who offended them? Yes, his murder was a terrible crime, but who has ever said that murder is an acceptable by-product of opposing Islamophobic words and pictures? Few, if any.

#4: Free speech is part of democratic society, and so these riots proved that many predominantly Muslim countries are not ready for democracy.

This would be a great argument were not so utterly de-contextualized. The basis of this line of reasoning is that free speech is a beloved component of European and North American socio-political reality. People in these regions can speak their minds without fear of reprisal, unlike countries in, for example, the “Middle East” where religious dissent is met with violence or death.  Let’s not be naïve here: many regimes in predominantly Muslim nations are incredibly violent and repressive, and their commitment to freedom of speech (as well as freedom of assembly and fundamental human rights) is close to zero. But if you think that this type of repression is relegated to the “Muslim world” then I would suggest brushing up on post-war South American dictatorships (start with Chile); or the recent history of the Balkans.  And, closer to home (for me, at least), it would be worth having a chat about actual tolerance for freedom of speech in the United States with Americans who dared to utter some uncomfortable truths about US geo-politics on September 12, 2001. Saudi Arabia is often held up as the poster-child for free speech repression in the name of Islam.  Is that the same Sharia-loving, free-speech hating Saudi Arabia, staunch US and UK ally, who in 2010 purchased $60 billion in US arms and whose leader was warmly welcomed by the Queen at Buckingham Palace in 2007? The one and same.

#5: Why should progressives spend time defending a religious group when there are far more pressing issues (such as poverty, gender inequality, etc.)? 

I don’t think of opposing Islamophobia as defending Islam any more that I consider opposing anti-Semitism as some kind of de facto support for Judaism.  Opposing Islamophobia is about opposing knee-jerk discrimination and xenophobia, dressed up as concern for “rights” (rights I rarely see addressed in other contexts) using vulgar stereotypes and crude generalizations. Finally, it is worth considering more precisely the role that poverty and inequality have played in the current unrest. While films, cartoons and religious fervor are held up as the main causes of the riots, I would suspect that a number of other factors have played into these events. If, however, we ignore these other factors in favor of the simple answer – “Muslim Rage” – then we contribute to an environment in which Islamophiobia, and thus discrimination, will thrive.

God Save Us From the Islam Cliches

It is sad to say, but a 2006 piece I wrote for the British Journalism Review on the skewed coverage of predominantly Muslim nations entitled, God Save Us From the Islam Cliches does not appear to have lost relevance. The opening section is about Turkey, but the majority addresses broader coverage. You can click on the link to access a PDF version.

Christensen, C. (2006). God Save Us From The Islam Clichés. British Journalism Review, 17(1): 65-70.

Assemblage, Adaptation and Apps: Smartphones and Mobile Gaming

An article written by myself and Patrick Prax entitled, “Assemblage, adaptation and apps: Smartphones and Mobile Gaming” has just been published in the latest issue of the journal Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies.

Abstract: As scholars such as Goggin (2009a) have noted, the rapid uptake of ‘smartphones’ has reshaped the ways in which software developers, users, and academics consider the interrelationship between mobility, culture, technology hardware, and the Internet. In addition, this uptake has added a significant new layer of encrustations around what we might define as ‘standard’ uses of mobile technologies. Once limited to the playing of pre-loaded (offline) games on mobile handsets, smartphones have allowed for not only mobile interactivity and enhanced visuals, but also the possibility of downloading apps that allow the user to add multiple new dimensions to the gaming experience. These developments are but one more factor in ‘thinking about games as assemblage, wherein many varying actors and unfolding processes make up the site and action’ (Taylor 2009, 332). Taking the theoretical perspectives of adaptation (Goggin 2009a; Farnsworth and Austrin 2010) and assemblage (Taylor 2009; Goggin 2009b) we will discuss three apps linked to the enormously popular World of Warcraft game, and the ways in which these applications both reshape how we might think about and use technology, and how smartphones and mobile applications also reconfigure social, technological, and generic relations.

Covering Assange: We Have Taken our Eyes off the Prize

An article I have written entitled Covering Assange: We Have Taken our Eyes off the Prize has just come out in the British Journalism Review. You can read the piece either as a BJR blog post, or you can download a PDF of the article from BJR’s homepage at Sage.

Christensen, C. (2012). We Have Taken our Eyes off the Prize. British Journalism Review, 23: 48-53.

Nick Cohen, Assange and US Power

If there is a better response to Nick Cohen’s ill-conceived article on paranoid WikiLeaks supporters than yesterday’s New York Times Op-Ed by former US President Jimmy Carter, then I am not sure where to find it. To my mind, Cohen is correct when he notes that some elements of the defense of Julian Assange by supporters have been very troubling – none more so than direct and indirect attacks on “radical feminism” in Sweden. I myself have written on this issue, and, a result, have been accused (via Twitter) of being an anti-WikiLeaks, anti-Assange agent of US-Swedish power. I am not any of these things, but it is increasingly obvious that these types of attacks come with the territory when commenting on WikiLeaks. If Cohen had a serious point about the potentially negative impact of some elements of the Assange defense, however, then they have been lost in a problematic line of reasoning .

Problem 1: An Ill-Informed Belief in US Justice

Radical socialists don’t become President of the United States of America, so when a former Commander-in-Chief writes the following, it carries a fair amount of weight:

Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations or “associated forces,” a broad, vague power that can be abused without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being blocked by a federal judge). This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration.

In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications. Popular state laws permit detaining individuals because of their appearance, where they worship or with whom they associate.

Carter’s article also reminds us that there are currently 169 prisoners being held in Guantanamo Bay who are denied the minimal right of habeas corpus. By ignoring the gross violations engaged in by the United States government, and by labeling WikiLeaks supporters conspiracy nuts, Cohen actually confirms what many Assange and WikiLeaks supporters suspect: that the mainstream media have a short-sighted vendetta against Assange because he beat them at their own game.

Problem 2: Cohen’s Piece is Ahistorical

In addition to ignoring the issues discussed by Carter – drones, Gitmo, lack of oversight on presidential power – Cohen fails to address the fact that history books on the last 50 years of domestic US and international politics are hardly reassuring reading for a person with a fear of extradition to the United States. Salvador Allende, Cuba, Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, Iran-Contra, Gulf War I, Afghanistan, Gulf War II, Gitmo, Extraordinary Rendition, Water-Boarding, Bradley Manning. When you look at this laundry list, and consider the fact that within many of these events hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals have either died, been attacked or had their rights violated, then someone like Assange surely has cause to be worried for his own safety.

What makes a theory a conspiracy theory (as a pejorative term) is a perceived ludicrousness: a proposition so outlandish and technically unlikely (usually due to the involvement of multiple actors engaged in hidden activity) that the person who utters it must be divorced from reality. Can we honestly say that Assange’s fear of extradition to, and potential imprisonment in, the US falls into this category? Let me put it this way: if you had told me 12 years ago that Sweden would allow CIA agents to detain, assault and interrogate two Egyptian nationals on Swedish soil, then drug and fly them from Stockholm to Egypt on a private jet for interrogation and torture, only to have Sweden deny it, I might have called that borderline conspiracy talk. But it happened.

Problem 3: The Watergate/Journalism Argument is Very Thin

Ah, Watergate. Every time a question pops up about freedom of speech in the United States, Watergate, the Washington Post, Deep Throat, the Pentagon Papers, Woodward, Bernstein and Nixon are trotted out and put on display as evidence of the Fourth Estate at work. Well, Watergate was 40 years ago, and this is not your father’s America. In the 40 years since Watergate we have precious few examples of US mainstream media actively challenging US corporate and military power. In fact, quite the opposite. We live with (and some in) a post-9/11 America of Freedom Fries, Fox News, the Tea Party and the Patriot Act. Yes, the First Amendment is a fantastic piece of writing, but remember that in 2010 the Citizens United decision made by the US Supreme Court held that corporations have the same free speech rights as regular, human citizens. Even great political documents can be perverted.

Cohen also suggests that WikiLeaks and Assange will likely be protected under US law because WikiLeaks, “was in effect a newspaper.” That is a pretty loose legal hook to hang the hat of your life on. Whether or not WikiLeaks is classified as a newspaper or journalistic organization is far from decided. Again, some context from Sweden: one of the reasons why WikiLeaks initially used servers located in Sweden was the perceived protection offered to the organization under Sweden’s stringent freedom of speech and whistleblower protection laws. Interestingly, however, that logic was called into question when it was noted that WikiLeaks would not be classified as a journalistic organization because it did not have what is known as a “responsible publisher” (a person legally responsible for the content): a condition necessary for an organization to be considered journalistic in Sweden. In other words, lots of assumptions can be made about WikiLeaks being a news organization, but assumptions don’t hold up in court.

Problem 4: Cohen Conflates WikiLeaks Supporters

As a final point, although I have been subject to some accusations (some of which were re-tweeted to 1.5 million WikiLeaks followers on Twitter) in relation to my questioning some WikiLeaks arguments, I suspect that the number of supporters who adhere to these dogmatic lines of thought, and attack those who disagree, is relatively small, and that their voices have disproportionate strength as a result of echo-chambers like Twitter. I get the sense that many supporters of WikiLeaks are regular people who are tired of being used and lied to, and want to support an organization which has shown a willingness and backbone to challenge some big schoolyard bullies.

It takes guts to challenge the United States: just ask people who have done so and paid the price. By playing the “conspiracy theory” card in relation to extradition to the US, and dismissing legitimate fears when there is ample evidence to the contrary, Cohen throws the baby out with the bathwater. US power is real, and US justice has shown a willingness to bend to that power when needed. That isn’t conspiracy theory, that is reality.

WikiLeaks, Assange & Feminism: Base and Superstructure

Let me get this out of the way first (a strategy I am starting to employ frequently when discussing WikiLeaks-related issues): I accept as a fact that the handing of the Assange case by Swedish authorities was embarrassing and unprofessional, and that a number of Assange’s rights have been violated; I accept as a fact that the media portrayal of Assange was unfair (in large part as a result of the Swedish authorities’ handling), and any presumption of innocence on his part dramatically decreased in the court of popular opinion; I accept as a fact that there has been a great deal of schadenfreude surrounding this case by those who would wish to see Assange and WikiLeaks silenced (including journalists who feel that WikiLeaks stepped on their turf); I accept as a fact that domestic politics in Sweden has played into the case (though the extent of this is unclear); and, I accept as a possibility that the US has exerted influence over the proposed questioning of Assange.

As a supporter of WikiLeaks, however, I have tweeted that I felt the “radical feminist” line in the Assange case promoted by, for example, de Noli and Burke was damaging, and that WikiLeaks should refrain from re-tweets to the articles so as to avoid undermining the important organizational goals of WikiLeaks.  Before I could finish, however, de Noli published an intellectually embarrassing (for him, not me) presentation of me and my work, to which I responded. Thus, I wanted to clarify my intellectual and personal positions in relation to WikiLeaks before writing this post, since I was misrepresented by de Noli. I don’t feel the need to justify my ideological credentials again. For those who want to know about me and where I stand, read my response.

So, what is my problem? What I feel is “nonsense” in many of the articles and essays on the feminism-Assange issue is this: that the discussion of feminism (and so-called “radical feminism”) has expanded beyond a discussion of any concrete relationship between these issues and the Assange case, and into a broader presentation of feminism in Sweden which serves to misrepresent, and undermine, what I consider to be TWO important social movements: transparency (the WikiLeaks agenda) and feminism itself.

Let me give a concrete example of what I am talking about. Helene Bergman, who is widely cited by de Noli and Burke in their analyses of Swedish feminism, wrote a piece entitled, “Assange is Right: Sweden’s the Saudi Arabia of Feminism”. To make clear that the title was not a catchy headline to attract readers, the following is a passage from the piece:

He (Assange) calls Sweden the Saudi Arabia of feminism. He was the only one who dared call it for what it is and I as a real feminist agree with him. Despite the fact that it’s enormously politically incorrect to criticise feminism in Sweden.

If Bergman is willing to accept and defend the assertion that Sweden is the “Saudi Arabia of feminism,” then I am afraid, to me, she loses all credibility as a commentator or expert on feminism in Sweden. To use my word: nonsense. And, thus, those who cite her (such as Burke and de Noli) as an authority also lose credibility. Women in Saudi Arabia are whipped, stoned and executed for the slightest “moral” or religious infractions; and, women in Saudi Arabia are denied even the most fundamental human rights in a brutal misogynist system. I must confess, as I go through my daily life in Stockholm – where I see newspapers obsessed with women’s bodies, vans driving by my apartment advertising strip clubs with huge pictures of nude women, university departments (at Uppsala, de Noli’s haven of “radical feminism”) where there is not one single female professor, and young girls sexualized in the most quasi-pedophilic manner in Swedish advertising – that this assertion is an insult not only to the women of Saudi Arabia, but to feminism. Sweden is the Saudi Arabia of feminism? Really? I can tell Bergman that, as a man living in Sweden, I don’t know any men who are veiled, can’t drive, or have been buried up to their necks and had their heads crushed by a hail of rocks thrown by women. But, maybe I just live in a nice part of town.

Supporters of Assange and WikiLeaks who cite this type of commentary cannot have their cake and eat it too. Any academic or journalist should know that the basis of intellectual thought is the building of one solid idea upon another. If one builds upon sand, however, the superstructure will fall. If they really believe that Sweden is like Saudi Arabia, then they are divorced from reality and abdicate their right to be “experts”. If they do not believe it, but still spread the comments anyway, then they are guilty of something worse: the use of what they know to be hyped-up, misleading opinion which could unfairly tar an entire group engaged in a just struggle (gender equality). Bergman is more than entitled to her opinion that Sweden is just like Saudi Arabia; but, as a WikiLeaks supporter, I also have the right to say that this opinion undermines both  WikiLeaks and feminist causes. To me, the ends simply do not justify the means.

Supporters need more than frenzied claims about Saudi Arabia; they need more than an interview with Helene Bergman (p. 49) where she says that she is, “fairly certain”  that other feminists agree with her, but that “so far none of them has dared to speak out”; and, supporters also need more than one retired judge who, upon cross-examination, admits that she: “had no personal knowledge of the conduct of the prosecutor in the case, basing her views instead on what she had been told”. In order to influence the court of popular opinion, WikiLeaks and Assange need better than this. Thus my disappointment. I am also tired of the juvenile and intellectually backward arguments that I get in response to these issues, which re-position me as some type of apologist for “radical feminism” without the slightest shred of evidence, simply because I dare to question some of the assumptions made.

The other form of nonsense which I find unacceptable is the use of vague suggestion, opinion and innuendo that radical feminism has some type of grip on Swedish socio-political life. In his essay, for example, Burke writes:

(…) while elements of the Social Democratic Party have assumed a leading role on such issues, they are hardly alone and are occasionally surpassed. The former leader of the Left Party, for example, famously or infamously declared that the “structures” of male dominance in Swedish society are essentially the same as those of the Taliban fundamentalists in Afghanistan. Given the current level of debate in Sweden, such pronouncements can be taken seriously in some quarters; and it is politically impossible, even for the Conservative Party, to ignore the strain of feminist thought that prosecutor Ny appears to be promoting at the expense of Julian Assange.

“Elements” and “some quarters”? Not very specific. It is interesting that Burke writes that these radicals are also “hardly alone” (equally vague), and offers a grand total of one example of broader acceptance of radical feminism in mainstream Swedish society: the former leader of the Left Party, in this case, is Gudrun Schyman, who went on to co-found the Feminist Initiative, the only feminist party in Sweden. Can I also point out the mind-numbingly obvious fact that Burke is ridiculing Schyman for comparing Sweden to fundamentalist Afghanistan, while at the same time (and along with de Noli) citing Bergman, who compares Sweden to fundamentalist Saudi Arabia. To me, both opinions are bullshit. To de Noli and Burke, however, only one opinion is bullshit. Yet I am the one who is  illogical and blinded by propaganda?

De Noli also used Schyman and the Feminist Initiative in his arguments:

Known right-wing “radical” Swedish feminists have themselves stated, “Julian Assange is a symbol” for their cause, and actively participated in mediatic anti-Assange campaigns or even publicly celebrated its success. Organizations of left-wing “radical” Swedish feminists  – to the best of my knowledge – have never taken distance from such deeds or positions. Moreover, the chairman of the Swedish Party Feminist Initiative, Gudrun Schyman, has publicly associated the case Assange with the need of “a better legislation than the one we have”. 

In brief response to these assertions, I tweeted the fact that the Feminist Initiative received a rather embarrassing 0.68% of the vote in the 2006 national elections, and 0.40% of the vote in 2010 – and that they were roundly beaten in both elections by the neo-fascist Sweden Democrats – and that this suggested that feminism (radical or otherwise) was not playing nearly as central a role in national politics as Burke and de Noli suggest. A simple, factual response, one would think. De Noli, however, in response to my tweet, wrote:

A third item is the confounding Christensen indulges when referring to “Radical feminism” in Sweden as if this – in fact an ideology or an ideological concept – would be simply equated with the political organization “Feminist Initiative” 

So, after de Noli and Burke use Schyman and the Feminist Initiative as evidence of the role of radical feminism in Swedish political life, I am then castigated by de Noli for using the election results for the Feminist Initiative as evidence of the role of radical feminism in Swedish political life. Again, they want their rhetorical cake (to spread suggestions that Sweden is a quasi-radical feminist state) and eat it as well (to simply paint those who provide problematic evidence as narrow-minded).

As I wrote above, it is my position that attacks by some (but not all) WikiLeaks supporters against feminism in the defense of Assange have been conducted in an intellectually slipshod fashion, and that the sloppiness of these attacks only serve to undercut – ironically, given the commitment of WikiLeaks to the exposure and eradication of structural inequalities in society – not only the efforts of feminists worldwide to fight patriarchy, but also the efforts of WikiLeaks volunteers and supporters to maintain the position of the organization as a serious actor in global politics. WikiLeaks and related organizations are much needed in contemporary society, but not, I would argue, at the expense of sacrificing the reputation of entire socio-political movements, many of whose members and supporters are in no way affiliated with the Assange case.

Let me end by saying that today, just a matter of days before the Assange decision comes from London, I read an interesting tweet from @x7o who wrote (in response to critics writing that WikLeaks’ tweets on Syria constituted de facto praise for Assad):

What is it about you people that you are so mind-numbingly stupid as to interpret criticism of one thing as praise of its opposite?

I couldn’t agree more with this sentiment. It’s just a shame that this logic is not utilized by some WikiLeaks followers who turn any critique of their position on feminism in Sweden into an accusation of a hatred of WikiLeaks and a pro-US, pro-war position.

Without the will to accept dissenting opinions without condemning the dissenter, any purported commitment to democracy, justice or freedom of speech is just a façade.

WikiLeaks Supporters: Thinking Right?

(This post is a response to Professor Christensen vs. WikiLeaks? by Marcello Ferrada de Noli. I have subsequently written a separate post on my specific thoughts on the relationship between WikiLeaks, feminism and Assange.)

WikiLeaks Supporters: Thinking Right?

I have a great job. As a university professor at Uppsala University in Sweden, I am afforded a number of luxuries not on offer to the vast majority of human beings throughout the world. I have a good salary, good working conditions, security and, importantly, a level of intellectual freedom which allows me to look at events in the world and consider them within broader, critical contexts. When I was promoted to the position of Professor at Uppsala, I made my feelings regarding the role of the academic in public life clear in my installation speech (a public lecture given by professors upon their promotion). I concluded my talk with the following quote from Noam Chomsky:

Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest, through which the events of current history are presented to us. The responsibilities of intellectuals, then, are much deeper than what Macdonald calls the “responsibility of people,” given the unique privileges that intellectuals enjoy.

In my academic work, I have attempted in some small way to live up to Noam Chomsky’s ideals, and mixed my research and writing with more public discussions on the uneven distribution of power in society in general, and the role of the media in this distribution in particular. My work to date has included academic studies on public broadcasting and commercial news in Sweden, the representation of Islam, the use of documentary film as an anti-war tool, concentration of media power in Turkey, the use of YouTube during the occupation in Iraq, and a critique of Swedish government aid to net activists. My popular, non-academic publications have been more wide-ranging, from pieces on Bruce Springsteen to Iran to US journalism, but I have always attempted to maintain a critical focus on commercial media, and the role that these media play in the consolidation of elite power. In all of these pieces I have not hidden my ideological rejection of (1) free-market myths, (2) arguments in favor of US supremacy and (3) structures which enable oppression or inequality.

In my more recent popular pieces (#1, #2, #3), I have turned my attention to WikiLeaks: an organization I considered (and still consider) to be a vital actor in the exposure of lies and abuses of power at the highest levels. While I recognize the importance of WikiLeaks, this recognition has not stopped me from raising questions regarding the activities of WikiLeaks or supporters that could, as far as I see it, have a potentially negative impact upon an agenda I consider worth pursuing (transparency in the service of justice). For anyone who has read these articles, it is clear that I mix a healthy respect for WikiLeaks with a desire to engage in honest discussion about what the organization has done, is doing, and where it is going. Without such debate, claims that the organization and the followers are democratic simply ring hollow.

It is for this reason that I sent out a tweet about a week ago following the re-tweet by WikiLeaks of a link to an article written by Al Burke entitled, “Suspicious Behavior.” In the tweet, I encouraged WikiLeaks to refrain from re-tweeting links to articles promoting a “radical feminist” thesis I described as “nonsense.” My irritation was based on the fact that the feminist line has been pushed by WikiLeaks via these re-tweets (including essays by de Noli). Of course, Twitter is not the best place to engage in a debate on why I felt the thesis was nonsense, so, following Twitter messages from 4 individuals (no more, by the way) challenging my assertion, I decided to write a blog post to explain my position, and why I feel that a promotion of this argument only serves to undercut the broader WikiLeaks political agenda. I fully accept that if I call the position “nonsense” on a public forum that I should be willing to put my reasons into writing.

However, before I could finish my piece, de Noli published a blog entry about me. I must say that I am grateful for this posting, as it made the work of explaining my general position on WikiLeaks much clearer. De Noli’s essay is, to my mind, a crystallization of everything that is intellectually wrong with a certain faction of WikiLeaks supporters, whose arguments are a melange of opinion, selective “facts” and dogma. (De Noli insinuates, based on no evidence whatsoever other than pure chronology, that my tweet was connected to a “message” that was sent to me via my blog from “an American campaigner”. It was not.)

After the post was published I wrote to de Noli on Twitter and informed him that I would be posting my own response, and that his post had re-enforced my feeling that anyone who disagreed with his thesis was automatically painted as anti-WikiLeaks and anti-Assange. De Noli sent me a number of tweets with links to logic websites and claims that he is only dedicated to “facts.” As I say, I was in the process of writing my arguments regarding the WikiLeaks-feminism thesis when de Noli posted his thoughts about me. So, I felt the need to clarify where I stand, and where I see myself in relation to WikiLeaks.

With De Noli’s dedication to “facts” in mind, I would like to address the points he raises, and use them to illustrate the intellectual weaknesses in his arguments.

Interestingly, de Noli starts his piece with an attack on the motto of my university:

“To think free is great; but to think right is greater” (att tänka fritt är stort att tänka rätt är store) Inscription engraved at Uppsala University’s library

“That a University calls on its scholars to think ‘right’ should trouble all who value academic freedom and the pursuit of knowledge. In fact, it harkens back to the old days when Universities were not independent centres of learning but were, indeed, constrained by the church and the Monarchy to “think right” or be shut down. Attacks on the scientific process and promotion of non-scientific dogma in some faculties in Uppsala University suggests that this old proclamation (still) reflects the University’s position in thinking according to cannons of political correctness imposed by an authority.” Professors blog

The quotation above was written by Thomas Thorild in 1794 and set in stone above the main university building in 1877. Exactly what this has to do with myself or WikiLeaks is an absolute mystery. Unless, that is, de Noli is under the impression that Uppsala University uses the university motto as a benchmark for all research produced at the institution. Since the university has established itself as a world-leader in the hard sciences, de Noli must be confused as to how this happened with such an anti-science motto. Either that, or de Noli is simply trying to link me, in an intellectually infantile manner, to a motto which I reject and consider to be complete bullshit.

Later in his piece, de Noli has a 720-word section entitled, Uppsala University and Swedish extreme “radical feminists” in which he discusses the hiring and work of feminist scholar Eva Lundgren (as well as a diatribe against qualitative research). De Noli explains:

The relevance of this to this article, is that it refers to the same Uppsala Faculty which has allocated several professors at the Ethical Research Committee of Uppsala that approved the “feminist” cultural-racists study by Eva Lundgren research associates – the theme which Professors blog analysed in “Throw them all out”.

This sentence sounds impressive, if you ignore the fact that it is completely irrelevant to my work. I have never met Eva Lundgren, never read or cited any of her research, never been involved in a research project, article, proposal, course, class, seminar, or lunch meeting with her. Nor has any of my work, to date, gone through the Ethical Research Committee de Noli mentions. Again, what Eva Lundgren’s job at Uppsala, or the Ethical Research Committee, has to do with me or WikiLeaks, and why he chose to spend so much time writing about someone I don’t even know and have never written about, is something only de Noli can explain. Unless, of course, de Noli feels that if Professor X is at the same university as Professor Y, that they must have some form of intellectual bond. Or, if a university hires someone questionable, or approves of their work, this de facto reflects upon all faculty members at that university. That would be like me saying that anyone who studied or worked at Harvard University, as de Noli did, has some type of intellectual connection to anyone else who studied or worked at Harvard. For example, Henry Kissenger, who green-lit the mass slaughter of Cambodians during the VietNam War, and not only wrote his dissertation at Harvard, but was Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program between 1958 and 1971. Or, a number of documented war criminals admitted to the university after their crimes were committed. So, Harvard is a university that condoned work with the US government and military during Viet Nam and has taken on documented war criminals. Does this make de Noli an intellectual accomplice to these people? No, because to suggest so would be absurd. To me, anyway.

My Background and Work

It is always fascinating to read a description of oneself written by another, especially when that person has carefully and selectively picked portions of your work and life, and offered descriptions of that work, which help them to shape a particular image of you. As noted, de Noli admonished me for a lack of logical rigor, and asked that we stick to “facts” in our discussions. As any scientist should know, the use of facts is by no means a guarantee that an accurate image will come out, especially when a scientist decides to omit certain facts which do not fit a particular agenda. Here is how de Noli described me:

Christian Christensen is an American researcher who graduated from Texas University and who was drawn to my attention for his several twitters and critical articles he has published on WikiLeaks, notably his most recent piece “WikiLeaks vs. Sweden”.

Let’s start here. Yes, I am American and I graduated from the University of Texas at Austin. I congratulate de Noli for finding those facts. Unfortunately, his ability to resist the temptation to shape reality takes hold in the second part of the sentence. His use of the term “several…critical articles he has written on WikiLeaks” is important. I have, to date, published four articles on WikiLeaks: two in Le Monde Diplomatique, one academic piece, and one on my blog. After the publication of my first piece in Le Monde Diplomatique entitled, WikiLeaks: Three Digital Myths, my name and contact information were placed on the WikiLeaks webpage as a contact in Sweden who would could “comment” on the organization to journalists. I guess WikiLeaks felt the piece exhibited enough thought to put me down as a commentator, which hardly suggests an antagonistic attitude to the organization on my part. Yet, for some reason, de Noli does not include this in his list of “facts.”

In all four of the articles I make clear my belief in the importance of WikiLeaks to contemporary society, and the ways in which the organization highlighted the failure of mainstream media to adequately tackle issues such as the Iraq War. Again, de Noli avoids these facts. Interestingly, a link to the Sweden vs. Assange article was re-tweeted by the @Wikileaks twitter feed (together with Kristinn Hrafnsson’s piece, which was placed as an “opposing view” to mine); to date, the essay has been viewed 452 times. This isn’t a massive number, but one would assume that if the essay was perceived as unfair or unbalanced, that I would get at least some negative feedback or accusations from WikiLeaks supporters of being anti-Assange or anti-WikiLeaks. I have not.

De Noli continues:

Christensen was academically stationed in Turkey after 2002 where he wrote several pieces on Iran and the role of social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs) in, among other areas “enabling the spread of state propaganda and surveillance”. Inferred from his CV, he has been also active in Finland or Norway before moving to Sweden where he has resided since 2006. In 2010 he received a professorship at Uppsala University. The Swedish government’s agency Council for Working Life and Social Research – a Swedish authority under the Ministry of Social Affairs – currently finances Christensen’s research with the equivalent sum of 383,484 USD (2.7 million Swedish Kr, or 300,000 Euro) for the project “The Social Journalist: News Work and News Organizations in an Age of Networked Sociality.” Christensen is professor of media and communication studies and in his personal presentation at the Uppsala University directory, he describes his primary special area being the “use of social media during times of war”.

Apart from the factual errors that I wrote these pieces on social media while living in Turkey (they were written in Sweden), and that I have have lived in Norway (I have not), the key here is de Noli’s description of my research project, which he writes is financed by “the Swedish government’s agency Council for Working Life and Social Research (link added by CC, not in original quote)– a Swedish authority under the Ministry of Social Affairs.”

See the clever rhetorical angle here? I can see the headline: “Professor who hates WikiLeaks and Assange has research paid for by Swedish government.” Yes, but, then again, everyone who is an academic in Sweden works for, and is paid by, the Swedish government, as universities are state institutions. Including de Noli, by the way, who made a career accepting Swedish government money as an academic in Sweden. And, as de Noli decides not to tell readers, the state is one of the largest funders of academic research in Sweden, regardless of discipline, so having a project funded from the state budget is hardly evidence of bias. And, for some strange reason, de Noli has forgotten to mention the very latest last academic article I published: a peer-reviewed critique of the current Conservative administration’s policy regarding Swedish state aid to global net activism (in addition to a large number of critical tweets I have directed at the current administration regarding this policy and other technology-related issues).

Finally, I would like to end by discussing de Noli’s key complaint against me: that I do not understand (or simply reject) the difference between the leaks that WikiLeaks release via their websites, and the information that they relay via, for example, Twitter. And, that I am part of some type of right-wing elite alliance to stifle freedom of speech. On the first issue, de Noli writes:

In sum, the interpretation errors here appear to be two-fold, in form and in content Formally, because it is up to WikiLeaks editors to decide both what to make public in disseminating information at their official sites and with whom and how to interact in their Twitter account; and also because it is erroneous to equate different modes in the societal interaction of WikiLeaks.

 Had de Noli bothered to look at what I had written in WikiLeaks vs. Sweden, he would have read the following:

Following the allegations made against Assange, and the rapid deterioration of the relationship between WikiLeaks and their former partners in the mainstream media (such as the New York, Times, Guardian and Der Spiegel), the organization has taken what appears to be a far more aggressive role. Rather than discussing relationships between media and governments, and citizens and governments, it is now necessary to address the direct relationship between WikiLeaks and these groups.  In particular, WikiLeaks has made use of Twitter (the organization has over one million followers) as a platform for the spread of information and opinion regarding a wide variety of issues. Via the use of this technology, WikiLeaks has expanded its brand beyond the collection and dissemination of leaked documents, to what appears to be a more direct advocacy-oriented strategy, with the organization mounting a campaign against perceived bias with the Swedish justice system in general, and those involved in the Assange case in particular. (…) What is clear from the Swedish case is that WikiLeaks has become something more than this: it has become an organization that is willing to confront not only governments, but also media outlets and even individuals via a variety of digital tools, not simply via leaked documents.

I am well aware that WikiLeaks representatives have denied that there was or is a deliberate campaign against Sweden; but, as I very clearly state, I suggested a clear campaign against perceived bias and those specifically involved in the case. And, as the section above also indicates – and in contrast to de Noli’s “analysis” of my position – I am also aware of the difference between leaks and what WikiLeaks releases via social media. In fact, that was the entire point of the article: how WikiLeaks was utilizing social media in contrast/addition to the leaks, and asking how this new angle could be considered in light of the organizations brand and raison d’etre. I would like to think this is a valid, important question for anyone genuinely interested in the future of WikiLeaks. It is also worth noting that in the entire article, the word “feminism” is used twice: once where I state that I am “surprised” that feminism was targeted so clearly in the tweets (which I am); and, the other was part of a quotation from the Swedish journalist Karin Olsson’s Guardian piece attacking Julian Assange: an article I described in my post as being “vitriolic.”

There is a real irony here. After 9/11, those of us from the United States who opposed the war in Iraq were often accused by conservatives and pro-war advocates as being un-American, pro-terrorism, anti-democracy and, worst of all, in favor of the troops being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, in this blinkered intellectual view (exemplified by Fox News), it was simply impossible to be a “good American” and be against the war. The lack of rational thinking in the argument made it difficult to counter. Unfortunately, I see many of the same tactics being employed by certain WikiLeaks followers, many of whom are quick to paint anyone who disagrees with any element related to the organization as anti-WikiLeaks, anti-Assange agents of US power. In other words, in this case, it is simply impossible to be a WikiLeaks supporter and critique the way in which the organization has tarred feminism in Sweden with a broad brush (which is the essential critique I will offer in my next post).

A decade of my popular research and writing is available online to be read, and so to be linked with right-wing think-tanks and conservative journalists as part of some kind of pro-US, pro-Sweden, anti-Assange, anti-WikiLeaks campaign would be funny, were it not so sad.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 2,462 other followers

%d bloggers like this: